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Determinants of Soft Budget Constraints: How Public Debt Affects Hospital 1 
Performance in Austria 2 
 3 
Abstract: 4 
Soft budget constraints (SBCs) undermine reforms to increase hospital service efficiency 5 
when hospital management can count on being bailed out by (subnational) governments in 6 
case of deficits. Using cost accounting data on publicly financed, non-profit hospitals in 7 
Austria from 2002 to 2015, we analyse the association between SBCs and hospital efficiency 8 
change in a setting with negligible risk of hospital closure in a two-stage study design based 9 
on bias-corrected non-radial input-oriented data envelopment analysis and ordinary least 10 
squares regression. We find that the European debt crisis altered the pattern of hospital 11 
efficiency development: after the economic crisis, hospitals in low-debt states had a 1.1 12 
percentage point lower annual efficiency change compared to hospitals in high-debt states. 13 
No such systematic difference is found before the economic crisis. The results suggest that 14 
sudden exogenous shocks to public finances can increase the budgetary pressure on publicly 15 
financed institutions, thereby counteracting a pre-existing SBC. 16 
Keywords: data envelopment analysis; soft budget constraints; hospital efficiency; 17 
bootstrapping; public debt; hospital budgets 18 
 19 
  20 
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1. Introduction 21 
In their quest to safeguard the financial sustainability of health-care systems, policymakers 22 
in several countries have implemented reforms targeting the efficiency of health-care service 23 
provision in public hospitals. A prime example is the introduction of payments based on 24 
prospective diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) (see Dan (2013), Kittelsen, Magnussen, and 25 
Anthun (2007), but also Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009) for surveys). Yet the 26 
effectiveness of these reforms is undermined as long as public hospitals can expect to be 27 
bailed out in times of financial distress, typically by subnational governments. Indeed, public 28 
hospitals are often subject to a soft budget constraint (SBC), i.e. ‘an ex ante behavioural 29 
regularity, which exerts an influence on the firm’s decision’ (Kornai, 1979, 1986). Hospital 30 
bailouts are often the only politically viable option at hand when policymakers want to avoid 31 
snubbing their constituency. 32 
Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009) use the inverse of 33 
the probability of a hospital closure as a measure of budgetary softness. In many cases, 34 
however, the probability of hospital closure converges towards zero, if the probability of 35 
bailout is virtually 100% in practice. Alternatively, the problem can be expressed via the 36 
federal governments’ commitment not to bail out additional expenditure at the local level (see 37 
Bordignon and Turati (2009)). The central issue, however, remains unchanged: Why should 38 
hospital management care about efficiency and not simply act as a budget-maximizing 39 
bureaucrat, as outlined in Niskanen's (1968) classic model of bureaucracy? Most likely, there 40 
will be an implicit upper limit on the maximum deficit that is tolerated without the 41 
owners/financiers replacing the management. Hospital management hence faces the dilemma 42 
of maximizing hospital budget and avoiding being laid off. Using the probability of a bailout 43 
as a measure of the softness of budgetary constraints neglects this dimension. 44 
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When hospital closures are unlikely, there is an additional caveat to the approach used by 45 
Brekke et al. (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009). If the probability of hospital closure 46 
converges towards zero for all hospitals, the budgetary constraint is equally soft for all 47 
hospitals and there should be no systematic differences in the efficiency changes between 48 
hospital groups. However, we propose that systematic differences in efficiency change can 49 
indeed be observed in countries with subnational autonomy like Austria. While the likelihood 50 
of hospital closure approaches zero, the debt burden of the states, which ultimately have to 51 
absorb any hospital deficits within the state, significantly influences the degree of budgetary 52 
softness, leading to systematic differences in state-level hospital efficiency changes. The 53 
financial crisis in 2009 and the subsequent European debt crisis constituted a strong 54 
exogenous shock to Austria’s public finances. EU legislation, adopted as a consequence of the 55 
debt crisis, further exposed so-called ‘hidden debts’ in Austria, including the debt of publicly 56 
owned hospitals. It is likely that revealing the ‘hidden debt’ of public hospitals further 57 
aggravated the problem of public debt, i.e. the compliance with the Maastricht criteria, in the 58 
political domain. A key hypothesis for the present analysis is that states with relatively high 59 
public debt were hit hardest by this development, which considerably limited the financial 60 
leeway of these state governments. The financial crisis, therefore, caused a rift in the 61 
budgetary constraints of hospitals in high-debt states, tilting the dilemma of hospital 62 
management towards higher budgetary discipline by making running deficits in the aftermath 63 
of the financial crisis more problematic. 64 
The empirical evidence from Austria is of interest for the following reasons: the Austrian 65 
DRG system does not cover the entire costs of publicly and privately owned non-profit 66 
hospitals providing publicly funded acute care (for simplicity referred to as ‘public hospitals’ 67 
henceforth). It only stipulates that at least 51% of hospital costs have to be financed out of 68 
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market-like revenues (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2017b), thereby implementing a rather soft budget 69 
constraint. The 51%-rule was supposed to ensure that public hospitals could still be assigned 70 
to the private sector according to the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA) 71 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2005). Any extra cost must be borne by regional authorities (state 72 
governments and municipalities) and the hospital owners (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2017a). In the 73 
past, publicly owned hospitals or hospital companies could count on the recovery of any extra 74 
cost, not least because of the high political pressure to ensure public hospital care. Since 2010, 75 
however, the ESA has deemed that any debt the state is held liable for must be assigned to the 76 
public sector. As a consequence, any deficits of public hospitals cause an increase in the ratio 77 
of government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) and thus endanger compliance with the 78 
Structural Pact 2012 (StP 2012) (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2013), which ratified the Treaty on 79 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (2012). 80 
Federal, state and local governments agreed to sustainably comply with a system of multiple 81 
fiscal rules introduced in 2017 to increase budgetary discipline. Non-compliance triggers 82 
financial sanction mechanisms, representing a major innovation compared to the Maastricht 83 
criteria.  84 
The purpose of this paper is threefold: firstly, we investigate whether different degrees of 85 
SBC can arise even when hospital closure is not a politically viable option. As this is a 86 
scenario that may occur quite frequently for public hospitals, we adapt the approach for 87 
modelling SBC used in Brekke et al. (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009) to better account 88 
for such situations by using public debt as an indicator of budgetary softness. Secondly, we 89 
use the financial crisis in 2009 and the ensuing European debt crisis as an exogenous shock to 90 
the states’ financial situations in our study framework, which affects hospital efficiency 91 
changes via the SBC, even though the probability of hospital closure remains negligible. Due 92 
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to some methodical challenges related to the data in this study, our study design does not 93 
allow a causal interpretation of the results. Our results should, therefore, be considered as 94 
explorative rather than as definitive empirical evidence. The literature further suggests that 95 
there is also an association between hospital ownership and efficiency (see, e.g. Chen, Chen, 96 
Chien, and Yu (2019) for a short overview of the relevant literature) or ownership and budget 97 
constraints (see, e.g. Eggleston (2008)). Against this background, we thirdly assess whether 98 
private owners respond differently to changes in the budgetary constraints compared to public 99 
owners. To serve our purposes we use a two-stage study design combining data envelopment 100 
analysis (DEA) with subsequent regression analysis. 101 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 102 
relevant literature on SBC and Section 3 describes the methods, sample and data. Results are 103 
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 discusses potential shortcomings and future research. 104 
2. Literature review  105 
Research into the SBC started with two seminal papers by Kornai (1979, 1986), who 106 
interpreted an SBC as a fiscal response of the government to avoid unemployment and secure 107 
public services in times of recession. Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003) broadened the range 108 
of SBC instruments, including tax concessions to foster certain producers, and administrative 109 
restrictions and import tariffs to hamper competitors. Theoretical models that attempt to 110 
predict the occurrence of an SBC are reviewed by Maskin (1996) who concludes that the 111 
centralization of credit allocation and production as well as public ownership of capital  112 
promote SBC. 113 
More recent contributions recognize that a budget constraint may be not only softened but 114 
also tightened. Bertero and Rondi (2000) show that public enterprises respond positively in 115 
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terms of productivity to a shift from soft to hard budget constraints while Besfamille and 116 
Lockwood (2008) predict that in a federal country, hard budget constraints may cause 117 
regional governments to underprovide public goods in their attempt to maintain budget 118 
balance.  119 
Recently, several studies have linked SBC theory specifically to the behaviour and 120 
performance of hospitals. Brekke et al. (2015) note that an SBC not only covers a deficit but 121 
may also entail confiscation of profit. They predict a negative association between the 122 
probabilities of bailout and profit confiscation on the one hand and cost-containment efforts 123 
on the other. As regards cost efficiency, Wright (2016), considering the responses of both 124 
public hospital and government to an SBC, applies game theory to identify conditions that 125 
promote the bailout of public hospitals. He concludes that an SBC hurts welfare while 126 
competition by a private hospital may enhance it. Duggan (2000) examines the responses of 127 
three hospital types (for-profit, private non-profit, and public) to financial incentives created 128 
by the US government in favour of indigent patients. The author shows that private for-profit 129 
and non-profit hospitals fail to use the additional revenue to improve quality of treatment for 130 
the poor; public ones do not seem to act more altruistically, even though they benefit from an 131 
SBC. Shen and Eggleston (2009) find that hospitals facing an SBC show less aggressive cost 132 
control behaviour, are less likely to shut down safety nets, and have better mortality 133 
outcomes. Investigating five hospital closures, Capps, Dranove, and Lindrooth (2010) find 134 
that the cost savings offset losses in terms of patient welfare in the US aggregate, but not 135 
locally. Eggleston et al. (2009) employ panel data on Chinese hospitals to estimate their 136 
probability of being bailed out in response to low or negative operating margins in the 137 
previous year. The authors relate this indicator of an SBC to hospital performance, with 138 
inconclusive results. In a similar vein, Audibert, Mathonnat, Pelissier, Huang, and Ma (2011) 139 
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use the extent of subsidies as an indicator of SBC to analyse the effects of health insurance 140 
reform on the technical efficiency of Chinese rural hospitals. They conclude that a higher 141 
revenue share of subsidies is negatively related to technical efficiency. In an interesting 142 
theoretical development, Levaggi and Montefiori (2013) see the regulator’s inability to 143 
observe the patient type and to assert hard budget constraints as a reason for patient selection. 144 
3. Methods, sample and data 145 
Theoretical background 146 
For analysing the effects of a shift from soft to hard budget constraints, we lean on the 147 
approach by Shen and Eggleston (2009), who measure the probability   of the budget 148 
constraint being soft through the inverse of the probability of hospital closure. The probability 149 
of hospital closures in Austria is close to zero (although several hospital mergers took place, 150 
the individual locations very often continued to exist). We, therefore, link the probability  of 151 
the budget constraint being soft with the budgetary situation of the state, measured as the ratio 152 
of financial debt to the state budget. Hospitals in states with a comfortable (critical) budgetary 153 
situation are considered to face a high (low) probability  of the budget constraint being soft. 154 
The budgetary situation is critical and points to an impending tightening of budgetary 155 
constraints when the government debt ratio is above the average of all nine states. Conversely, 156 
the budgetary situation is comfortable if it is below the corresponding mean. This way, the 157 
SBC is endogenously determined. We use a time-invariant classification in two groups 158 
because we consider the debt ratio of one state relative to the debt ratios of other states to be 159 
more important than the (change in the) absolute debt ratio and to be a more conservative 160 
choice of estimating the effect of SBCs. For one thing, it is not clear how a unit change in the 161 
absolute debt ratio should be defined such that we can reasonably expect it to cause a change 162 
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in the behaviour of states and hospitals. Additionally, it is unlikely that a change in the 163 
absolute debt ratio would have a uniform effect across the entire spectrum of debt ratios. The 164 
time-invariant classification circumvents this problem. The states’ debt ratios further cluster 165 
the states into two groups (high-debt states and low-debt states). Keeping the number of 166 
groups that are compared to each other low allows keeping the number of observations per 167 
group as high as possible, which is beneficial in situations with small samples. Lastly, the 168 
time-invariant classification is a safer choice, because the timing of any effects is unclear, 169 
particularly as some efficiency-enhancing measures may take time to unfold (e.g. when older 170 
employees are not laid off, but their position is rather left unfilled once they retire).  171 
The rationale behind linking the budgetary situation with the SBC and the hospital 172 
efficiency is as follows: the first relevant factor is the financial dependence of the state 173 
governments. State governments cannot levy taxes. They depend on the funds allocated based 174 
on negotiations with the federal government, creating a situation of vertical fiscal imbalance. 175 
A high debt ratio hence increases the dependence of the state government on the federal 176 
government, effectively reducing the space for political manoeuvring and the ability to handle 177 
costly bailouts. Accordingly, a high debt ratio also increases the credibility of the state 178 
government to commit to stricter budgetary rules and not to bail out hospital management.  179 
The second relevant factor is the behaviour of hospital management. A priori, we assume 180 
hospital managers want to keep their jobs, which could be jeopardized if a bailout is required. 181 
However, the blame could be passed to the state government (similar to the blame game in 182 
Norway in the 1990s (Tjerbo & Hagen, 2009)), claiming that deficits are due to insufficient 183 
funding rather than poor management decisions. This reasoning is easier when the state’s 184 
resources are abound. The budgetary situation of the states thus increases the stakes 185 
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associated with a bailout and requires both state governments and hospital management to 186 
adapt their behaviour. 187 
We implicitly assume in our framework that a reduction in inputs does not affect the 188 
quality of hospital care. This is a strong assumption, which is required by the missing 189 
availability of quality indicators for Austrian hospitals. Strict budgetary discipline may come 190 
at the expense of care quality and patients’ well-being. But high expenditure levels in most 191 
European health-care systems and professional ethos could offset this effect and prevent a 192 
substantial decline in quality of care when budgets tighten. Of course, hospitals could also 193 
reduce the quality of amenities, e.g. meals, which could affect patient satisfaction but not their 194 
well-being. 195 
Conversely, lower hospital efficiency may also just reflect higher quality of care. Overall, 196 
it is unclear, whether the relationship between hospital efficiency, budgetary discipline and 197 
quality of care is that close. Empirical evidence suggests that higher efficiency can be realised 198 
without curbing quality of care (Piacenza & Turati, 2014; Street, Gutacker, Bojke, Devlin, & 199 
Daidone, 2014). 200 
Sample and data 201 
Austrian hospitals can be classified using various and partly overlapping structural features 202 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2017a), including, inter alia, the level of care (standard, extended, 203 
maximum, and specialized, the categorization depending on the number and combination of 204 
the minimum required medical specialties), type of financing (DRG-based, non-DRG-based), 205 
benefit status (non-profit, for-profit) and ownership (public or private). We confine our 206 
analysis to DRG-financed non-profit hospitals, because legal requirements, service level as 207 
well as cost accounting and performance data are unified for this group. 208 
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In 2015, 120 hospitals were eligible for DRG financing through state health funds, 209 
accounting for approximately 71% of the nationwide bed capacity. Of these 120 hospitals, 65 210 
provided standard care, 23 offered extended care, 7 maximum, and 25 specialized care. Only 211 
29 hospitals were privately owned, 25 thereof by religious orders. The 120 hospitals had costs 212 
of around € 12.7 billion in 2015. 213 
The accounting data provided by the Ministry of Health cover the years 2002 to 2015. We 214 
only focus on the inpatient sector for three reasons: first, the documentation of outpatient 215 
services was reformed in 2014, making a structural break in outpatient coding likely. In 216 
addition, coding accuracy in outpatient departments before 2014 was not as high as in 217 
inpatient departments because the level of outpatient services provided had no impact on the 218 
level of funding. Lastly, distortions in outpatient data are likely following differences in the 219 
hospital structure and their mapping in terms of coding algorithms (Rous, 2015). 220 
The observation period is split into two subperiods (2002 to 2008, and 2009 to 2015) 221 
following a major revision of the DRG system, which came into force in 2009, resulting in 222 
substantially increased DRG credits per case and changes in the relative cost weights between 223 
the different DRG groups. With inputs stable, this would be reflected by sudden and artificial 224 
surges and drops in hospital efficiency within a DEA framework. Since the break in the time 225 
series coincides with the onset of the financial crisis, we exploit this circumstance to test 226 
whether there was a break in the pattern of hospital efficiency change associated with the 227 
timing of the financial crisis. By performing the DEA analyses separately for the two 228 
subperiods, we do not consider any efficiency changes from 2008 to 2009 that are likely to be 229 
skewed by the DRG re-weighting. In contrast to the immediate re-weighting implications, the 230 
impact of a budgetary constraint on the catch-up should be more gradual as hospital 231 
management requires some time to take action. A gradual effect following a change in case-232 
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mix towards more lucrative DRGs is unlikely, as DRG-funded public hospitals are obliged by 233 
law to admit any person in need of care so that patient selection is almost impossible. In 234 
addition, hospital management cannot freely decide on the beds per speciality, as these are 235 
subject to central planning by the state governments. 236 
Although DRG weights are set at the national level, the monetary value of a DRG point 237 
may differ between the states, since the ex-ante allocated funds per state are ex-post divided 238 
by the total number of DRG points of all hospitals in the respective state. In this regard, a 239 
hospitals’ ability to generate additional revenue by increasing output (DRG points) are 240 
limited. This implies that extra funds are needed in case of overshooting costs. The states have 241 
the possibility of allocating funds beyond DRG funds to the different hospitals, not only to 242 
address a hospital’s specific role in the state’s health-care system, but also to cover occurring 243 
deficits. How generous this additional funding can be, therefore, depends crucially on the 244 
state’s financial situation. 245 
Figure 1 shows the development of the debt ratio in the nine states. Following the 246 
previously introduced definitions, the budgetary situation in 2002−2008 is critical in five 247 
states (Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Salzburg and Vienna) and comfortable in four 248 
states (Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol and Vorarlberg). Between 2009 and 2015, the budgetary 249 
situation changes for two states (Burgenland and Styria).  250 
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 251 
Figure 1: Development of the debt ratio of the nine Austrian states from 2003 to 2015. 252 
Methods: data envelopment analysis 253 
In the first stage, we use DEA to assess hospital efficiency changes over time. Most of the 254 
analysed hospitals start from a state of inefficiency, i.e. they use more inputs than necessary to 255 
provide a specific output level. By reducing inputs while keeping output stable, these 256 
hospitals can improve their technical efficiency. Assuming there are no changes in the 257 
production technology (i.e. shifts in the production frontier), hospitals then move closer to the 258 
production frontier, i.e. they catch up. We compute the period t catch-up by: 259 
ℎ– 	 = 
	
	,	 
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period t-1 to period t. 261 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
D
e
b
t 
R
a
ti
o
13 
 
 
Within the DEA framework, we fall back on technical efficiency. We cannot compute 262 
economic efficiency, which secures a particular output level at the lowest cost, as the required 263 
data are not available. 264 
DEA is chosen over the alternative stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner, Lovell, & 265 
Schmid, 1997) as SFA requires the specification of a functional relationship between inputs 266 
and outputs, usually boiling down to the Cobb−Douglas variant in spite of its severe 267 
restriction of unitary elasticity of substitution (see, e.g. Varian (1992), Ch. 1.9). In addition, 268 
DEA can deal with multiple outputs without requiring their transformation into costs as a 269 
scalar exploiting the duality of output maximization and cost minimization (which holds only 270 
at the efficient point). By contrast, estimating a cost function applying SFA requires data on 271 
factor prices, information that is unavailable for public Austrian hospitals.  272 
There are some known limitations to the DEA approach: first, the units need to belong to the 273 
same technological universe, using the same types of input to produce the same types of 274 
output. Second, the discriminatory power of DEA depends on the total number of inputs m 275 
and outputs s relative to the number of n units assessed. Our sample satisfies the rule of thumb 276 
(see, e.g. Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2007), chapters 1 and 4) requiring that 277 
 > 	 ∙ , 3 ∙  + ! 1 
Third, the selection of variables has to be particularly careful since there are no tests for 278 
judging statistical significance, or stability of the efficiency results. Fourth, DEA is not robust 279 
to measurement errors, especially at the extreme ends of the isoquant, which can affect all 280 
efficiency scores by shifting the entire isoquant. 281 
We performed sensitivity analyses regarding homogeneity and the choice of variables to 282 
address these issues. To increase the robustness, the data-generating process (DGP) is 283 
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simulated using the bootstrap algorithm proposed by Tone (2013), which assumes input and 284 
output data to follow a triangular distribution. Since this imparts a stochastic property to the 285 
efficiency scores, a second-stage analysis relating them to changes in the softness of the 286 
budget constraints using regression analysis can be justified. Mitropoulos et al. (2018) 287 
recently used a similar method to make use of a second-stage regression to estimate the effect 288 
of hospital reforms following the financial crisis on efficiency development in Greek 289 
hospitals. 290 
For the DEA, we use the input-oriented non-radial efficiency and super-efficiency models 291 
developed by Tone (2001, 2002) (see appendix). The input orientation is justified by noting 292 
that public hospital management has more discretionary power over inputs than outputs. The 293 
use of the non-radial model has the advantage of capturing input savings beyond their 294 
proportionate reduction as in the radial alternative.  295 
The bias-corrected catch-up is used as the dependent variable to form a panel data set to 296 
estimate the relationship between budget constraints and hospital efficiency change. As the 297 
catch-up is based on the bias-corrected estimator for the unobserved efficiency obtained in the 298 
first stage, we avoid the fallacy of ignoring the bias term owing to the inherent serial 299 
correlation in the estimated catch-up (Simar & Wilson, 2007).  300 
The DEA input-output specification (Model I) is based on the relevant literature 301 
(Anonymous, 2005; Hadji, Meyer, Melikeche, Escalon, & Degoulet, 2014; Hollingsworth, 302 
2008; Jakobs, Smith, & Street, 2006; O’Neill, Rauner, Heidenberger, & Kraus, 2008) and the 303 
peculiarities of the Austrian hospital system (Anonymous, 2000, 2014; Hofmarcher, Paterson, 304 
& Riedel, 2002) and avoids typical pitfalls of DEA applications as described in Dyson et al. 305 
(2001). Full-time equivalents (FTEs) of physicians (PHYS), nurses (NURSE) and other staff 306 
(OTHER) serve as proxies of labour inputs, imputed costs (including depreciation and 307 
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interest) as a proxy for capital input. Operating (OPER_COST) and secondary costs 308 
(SEC_COST) cover the other resources to provide inpatient care. As output, we use DRG 309 
credits (CREDITS), which reflect case-mix and thus severity-adjusted services. 310 
To judge the stability of efficiency results, we investigate two additional input-output 311 
specifications. In Model II, we decompose operating costs into medical (MED_COST) and 312 
non-medical operating costs (NONMED_COST) to see if differences in resource use for 313 
medical supplies and consumables affect catch-up (see, e.g. Anonymous (2015)). In Model III 314 
we decompose DRG credits into credits based on major medical procedures 315 
(MEL_CREDITS) and other credits (mostly credits that use the principal diagnosis to charge 316 
the services) (HDG_CREDITS), because we assume specialized hospitals to be efficient in 317 
the production of either MEL or HDG credits, but not necessarily in their aggregate. 318 
Variables Labels Units of 
measurementa 
Model 
I 
Model 
II 
Model 
III 
Inputs:      
Physicians PHYS FTE x x x 
Nurses NURSE FTE x x x 
Other staff OTHER FTE x x x 
Imputed costs IMP_COST € x x x 
Primary costs less labour and imputed costs OPER_COST € x  x 
Medical costs (Cost of medical commodities, 
consumables and third-party services) 
MED_COST €  x  
Operating costs less medical costs NONMED_COST €  x  
Secondary costs (Cost of auxiliary cost centres allocated to 
inpatient cost centres) 
SEC_COST  € x x x 
Outputs      
Diagnosis-related groups (DRG) credits CREDITS Number x x  
MELb credits MEL_CREDITS  Number   x 
HDGc + other credits HDG_CREDITS Number   x 
a Costs are deflated to 2000 prices. bCredits based on major medical procedures. cCredits based on main diagnostic groups. 319 
Table 1: Model specifications 320 
Hospitals must be part of a homogeneous universe to be amenable to DEA. Therefore, we 321 
exclude the three university hospitals (Vienna, Graz and Innsbruck) because university 322 
hospitals have teaching and research responsibilities and are hence not comparable to other 323 
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‘regular’ general hospitals. Then we remove outliers using the super-efficiency approach 324 
(Banker & Chang, 2006; Hofmarcher et al., 2002) for the input-output specifications in Table 325 
1. Outliers are hospitals with super efficiency higher than 1.5 times the inter-quantile range 326 
(25% and 75%). As Austrian public hospitals are subject to a unified cost accounting and 327 
reporting software, outliers are assumed to result from measurement error, DRG upcoding, or 328 
inhomogeneous technology. In any case, hospital efficiency is likely to be distorted.  329 
In the case of hospital mergers, we compute efficiency scores for the respective subperiod 330 
using virtual mergers between the merged hospitals in the years prior to the merger. In the 331 
case of mergers of hospitals operating at different care levels, the care level specification of 332 
the actual merger is used retrospectively for the virtual merger. Finally, in the case of zero 333 
inputs, the hospital is dropped from the sample for the relevant subperiod, including hospitals 334 
that ceased their operations during the subperiod. 335 
We eliminate a total of 19 hospitals in each subperiod, resulting in a final sample of 110 336 
hospitals in the subperiod 2002 to 2008 and 109 hospitals in the subperiod 2009 to 2015 for 337 
Model I. As different input specifications yield different outliers, the outlier analysis resulted 338 
in different sample sizes for each model specification (Table 2). The descriptive statistics for 339 
the variables included in the main DEA Model I are provided in the appendix. 340 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 
2002−08 2009−15 2002−08 2009−15 2002−08 2009−15 
All hospitals 129 128 129 128 129 128 
University hospitals 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Outliers 10 6 10 8 14 12 
Zero input 6 10 6 10 11 14 
N 110 109 110 109 101 99 
Table 2: Hospitals excluded from the sample per model specification and observation period 341 
Methods: Regression analysis 342 
In the second stage of the analysis, we utilize the (semi-)time-invariant budgetary situation 343 
as a proxy for the softness of the budget constraint. Several factors hinder the implementation 344 
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of an identification strategy that would allow a causal interpretation of the results: The (semi-345 
)time-invariant variable, in combination with the volatility of the efficiency scores inhibits a 346 
difference-in-difference approach as the changing budgetary situation complicates the 347 
assignment to the treatment and control group, and the common-trend assumption between the 348 
two groups is violated. The small sample size and the lack of suitable data bars the use of an 349 
instrumental variable regression. 350 
Although unobserved state- and hospital-specific factors are likely to affect hospital 351 
efficiency over time, the (semi-)time-invariant SBC variable does not allow using a fixed-352 
effects model. While this comes at the expense of the time dimension not being fully 353 
exploited, the specification is more robust to the unclear timing of the SBC effect. To consider 354 
unobserved state- and hospital-specific factors, we, therefore, include a set of time-variant and 355 
time-invariant hospital characteristics (Anonymous, 2014). 356 
We run the following time-invariant regression model separately for the pre-crisis and 357 
post-crisis periods: 358 
Y#$% = α + 	β()*	 + γ,- + δ	X$% + ε$% (2) 359 
where the dependent variable Y#$% is the bias-corrected catch-up of hospital i at time t. YEAR% is 360 
a categorical variable capturing countrywide development at time t, B$ is a categorical 361 
variable indicating the budgetary situation for hospital i with γ capturing the effect of interest. 362 
X$% is a matrix capturing a variety of additional hospital characteristics (e.g. type, ownership, 363 
case-mix, patient structure) we control for. X$% also includes a variable that decomposes 364 
hospitals in efficiency quartiles based on the efficiency in (2002 and 2009, respectively) to 365 
account for the heterogeneity in efficiency change due to their starting position in the two 366 
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subperiods (2002−2008 and 2009−2015). Table 3 summarizes the variables used in the 367 
regression analysis over both periods. 368 
  369 
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Variable: Sample: Model I 
2003−2015  
 
Obs/Freq Mean/% Std dev Min Max 
Ownership 1,314   0 1 
Public 1,014 77.17%    
Private 300 22.83%    
Hospital Type 1,314   1 4 
Maximum care 24 1.83%    
Extended care 318 24.20%    
Special care 264 20.09%    
Standard care 708 53.88%    
Population Density 1,314   1 3 
Low 246 18.72%    
Medium 612 46.58%    
High 456 34,70%    
Patient Structure      
0−19 years 1,313 0.077537 0.1140641 0 0.9800371 
20−39 years 1,313 0.1553441 0.0697382 0 0.4777778 
60−79 years 1,313 0.3571567 0.0877378 0 0.6085526 
80+ years 1,313 0.1634871 0.0745245 0 0.6171053 
Hospital Size      
Number of beds 1,314 349.8813 279.1053 30 1581 
Case-Mixa      
HHI 1,313 0.128748 0.1662139 0.0382349 1 
Super-efficiency 
Level 
     
2002 103 0.8230939 0.2117899 0.455462 1.455367 
2009 109 0.8496697 0.2170794 0.490956 1.474389 
Performance 
Indicator 
     
Catch-up 1,314 1.01025 0.1015358 0.5701498 1.824302 
aCase-mix is measured using the Herfindahl−Hirschman-Index (HHI), a statistical indicator that 
allows capturing the degree of concentration of single hospitals between the main groups of DRG-
points in the Austrian DRG system:  
556 = ∑ -89-:  with - = ;<∑ ;=>=?@  where - = number of hospital stays with the 
	A
 HDG (main 
diagnostic groups) or MEL (major medical procedures) group. 
Table 3: Summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis based on DEA Model I 370 
The model is estimated with pooled OLS using White’s heteroscedastic-consistent standard 371 
errors, which provides consistent estimates for DEA scores in a second-stage regression 372 
(Hoff, 2007; McDonald, 2009) and the catch-up as it has similar statistical properties. The 373 
estimation strategy does not suffice to establish a truly causal relationship between the SBC 374 
and the efficiency development. However, it can still highlight systematic differences between 375 
groups of hospitals (budgetary situation) following a common shock to public finances, 376 
hinting at a relationship. 377 
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4. Results 379 
We report the bias-corrected catch-up based on 1,500 replications at the state level 380 
separately for the two subperiods (Table 3 and Table 4) alongside with the average indices per 381 
year (last column) and per state (last row). 382 
States in critical budgetary situations show higher average catch-ups, whereas hospital 383 
efficiency remains stable in states in comfortable budgetary situations. The rapid increase in 384 
the debt ratio from 2010 to 2011 in Salzburg reflects a second exogenous shock to the public 385 
finances following the initial shock in 2009, resulting in a catch-up of 1.05 and 1.06 in 2012 386 
and 2013, respectively. 387 
The catch-up results at the state level are fairly robust to disaggregating operating costs 388 
into medical and non-medical operating costs (Model II) and CREDITS into HDG_CREDITS 389 
and MEL_CREDITS (Model III). 390 
 Critical Comfortable  
Catch-Up 
Burgen-
land Carinthia 
Lower 
Austria Salzburg Vienna 
Upper 
Austria Styria Tyrol Vorarlberg Ø 
2003 1.0435 1.0172 1.0071 1.0897 0.9974 1.0380 1.0084 1.0202 0.9713 1.0172 
2004 0.9453 0.9730 1.0245 0.9532 0.9651 1.0157 1.0111 0.9899 0.9485 0.9883 
2005 0.9915 1.0188 0.9960 0.9690 1.0281 0.9882 0.9552 1.0169 0.9917 0.9936 
2006 0.9877 0.9786 0.9922 1.0464 1.0519 0.9815 1.0493 0.9852 0.9990 1.0170 
2007 1.0887 1.0159 1.0135 1.0101 1.0240 1.0007 1.0177 1.0242 1.0193 1.0196 
2008 1.0559 0.9820 1.0192 1.0030 0.9909 1.0176 1.0113 1.0322 1.0062 1.0097 
Ø 
2002−2008 1.0188 0.9976 1.0088 1.0119 1.0096 1.0069 1.0088 1.0114 0.9893 1.0076 
           
Table 4: Bias-corrected catch-up with Model I in DRG-financed hospitals in Austria from 2002 to 391 
2008, by states (N=110) 392 
 Critical Comfortable  
Catch-
Up 
Carinthi
a 
Lower 
Austria 
Salzbur
g Styria Vienna 
Burgen-
land 
Upper 
Austria Tyrol Vorarlberg Ø 
2010 1.0055 1.0349 0.9735 1.0658 1.0101 0.9650 0.9839 0.9941 0.9872 1.0115 
2011 1.0406 1.0536 1.0142 1.0458 1.1154 1.0458 1.0097 0.9974 1.0152 1.0457 
2012 1.0513 1.0090 1.0485 0.9931 1.0109 0.9960 0.9833 1.0017 0.9780 1.0078 
2013 0.9639 0.9959 1.0618 1.0297 1.0034 1.0706 0.9994 1.0009 1.0129 1.0112 
2014 1.0046 0.9938 1.0038 0.9842 1.0124 0.9734 1.0207 1.0164 0.9877 1.0012 
2015 1.0116 0.9942 0.9782 0.9708 1.0394 0.9796 1.0114 1.0012 0.9939 1.0004 
Ø 
2009−2
015 
1.0129 1.0136 1.0133 1.0149 1.0319 1.0051 1.0014 1.0019 0.9958 1.0130 
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Table 5: Bias-corrected catch-up with Model I in DRG-financed hospitals in Austria from 2009 to 393 
2015, by states (N=109) 394 
The effect of the states’ debt ratios on hospital efficiency changes via the channel of 395 
tightening or relaxing the SBC is more thoroughly isolated through the second-stage 396 
regression specified in Equation (2). Relevant results using Model I are reported in Table 6. 397 
The hospital-level covariates ownership, hospital type, population density of the catchment 398 
area, patient structure, case-mix and size (using the actual number of beds/100 as a proxy to 399 
allow for meaningful effects of one-unit changes) do not influence efficiency changes. 400 
With regard to the debt ratio, we find no systematic differences across hospitals in the pre-401 
crisis period 2002−2008 as opposed to the post-crisis period 2009−2015, where a 1.56 402 
percentage point lower catch-up in states in a comfortable budgetary situation is observed. 403 
This effect is significant at the 5% level (p-value=0.019). Controlling for the heterogeneity in 404 
the initial efficiency levels using efficiency quartiles (see columns (3) and (4)) reduces both 405 
size and statistical significance of the SBC effect in the post-crisis period, with a 1.12 406 
percentage point lower annual catch-up significant at the 10% level (p-value=0.099). The 407 
effect of the efficiency quartiles is strong and highly significant in both subperiods, revealing 408 
considerable differences in the catch-up between hospitals in the bottom and top quartiles. 409 
This effect is robust to different specifications of the underlying DEA model, and also to 410 
using tertiles or quintiles for the initial efficiency levels. 411 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Catch-Up Catch-Up Catch-Up Catch-Up 
Regression Period: 2003−2008 2010−2015 2003−2008 2010−2015 
 
Coeff 
(Std error) 
Coeff 
(Std error) 
Coeff 
(Std error) 
Coeff 
(Std error) 
Ownership     
Private -0.0104 0.0137 -0.00532 0.0139 
 (0.0114) (0.00994) (0.0119) (0.00995) 
Hospital Type     
Maximum care 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Extended care 0.0180 0.0243 0.0142 0.0206 
 (0.0221) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0180) 
Special care 0.0237 0.0380* 0.0115 0.0222 
 (0.0272) (0.0214) (0.0285) (0.0217) 
Standard care 0.00503 0.0315 -0.00297 0.0258 
 (0.0246) (0.0217) (0.0267) (0.0225) 
Population Density     
Low 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Medium -0.000731 -0.00415 -0.00218 -0.00540 
 (0.0132) (0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0108) 
High -0.00142 0.00499 -0.00548 -0.000929 
 (0.0146) (0.0122) (0.0153) (0.0128) 
Patient Structure     
0−19 -0.122 0.0155 -0.132 -0.0163 
 (0.110) (0.0724) (0.108) (0.0720) 
20−39 -0.240 0.104 -0.244 0.0138 
 (0.198) (0.158) (0.194) (0.156) 
60−79 -0.188 0.0885 -0.197 0.0223 
 (0.194) (0.130) (0.191) (0.130) 
80+ -0.0125 0.0336 -0.0334 0.00924 
 (0.121) (0.0605) (0.121) (0.0583) 
Hospital size     
Number of beds -0.00124 0.00228 -0.00108 0.00235 
 (0.00229) (0.00226) (0.00232) (0.00221) 
Case-Mix     
HHI -0.0246 -0.0182 -0.00642 0.00852 
 (0.0272) (0.0210) (0.0272) (0.0203) 
Budgetary Situation     
Critical 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Comfortable 0.00165 -0.0156** -0.000673 -0.0112* 
 (0.00915) (0.00661) (0.00977) (0.00679) 
Initial Efficiency – 
Quartiles 
    
1st - Bottom   0 0 
   (.) (.) 
2nd   -0.0135 -0.00421 
   (0.0146) (0.0135) 
3rd    -0.0176 -0.0240** 
   (0.0141) (0.0111) 
4th - Top   -0.0322** -0.0303*** 
   (0.0134) (0.00998) 
     
Constant 1.125*** 0.925*** 1.155*** 0.987*** 
 
(0.126) (0.0833) (0.123) (0.0852) 
     
N 617 648 617 648 
R² 0.0124 0.0173 0.0215 0.0320 
F-Statistic 0.62 1.10 0.94 1.89 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 413 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 414 
Table 6: OLS regression results with catch-up based on DEA Model I: regressions run separately for 415 
the two pre- and post-crisis subperiods and controlling for different starting levels of efficiency 416 
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With an R² ranging from roughly 0.01 to 0.03, the overall fit of the regression models is 417 
low. This could indicate that the catch-up is not well described by the chosen covariates and 418 
differences are likely to be caused by unobserved confounders, such as managerial ability, 419 
informal structures of leadership, etc. These variables are, however, not available. But 420 
considering the high volatility of efficiency scores obtained from DEA and that hospital-level 421 
data is used – which results in a low number of not only observations but also groups for 422 
comparison – the low model fit is not surprising. 423 
The effect of the debt ratio is not robust to alternative DEA model specifications. In Model 424 
II, the effect of the comfortable budgetary situation loses size and significance in the post-425 
crisis period. In Model III, the budgetary effect misses significance at the 10% level in the 426 
post-crisis period, albeit not by very much. The size of the effect remains roughly the same. 427 
5. Conclusions 428 
In this paper, we analyse the effect of a tightening of budget constraints on hospital 429 
efficiency change of Austrian DRG-financed hospitals resulting from an exogenous shock to 430 
public finances. We use an input-oriented slacks-based DEA efficiency model to compute the 431 
annual catch-up over a period of 13 years. In the second stage, we analyse the impact of the 432 
budgetary situation of the states on hospital efficiency change using a pooled OLS regression. 433 
The main motivation to investigate the association of the budgetary situation of the financing 434 
body and the hospital efficiency is that any policy measures to increase the efficiency of 435 
hospital service provision are undermined whenever hospitals are subject to a SBC. 436 
We consider the peculiarities of the Austrian health-care system as we neither abstract 437 
from the problem that, in practice, hospital closure might be virtually impossible, nor do we 438 
assume the existence of SBCs to be exogenously given. We rather argue that a tightening or 439 
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further softening of an SBC is closely related to the financial situation of the financing 440 
government body, i.e. the state government. We thereby explore the possibility of using the 441 
state government’s public debt ratio as a proxy for the changes in the SBC.  442 
Using cost-accounting data from Austrian DRG-financed hospitals from 2002 to 2015, we 443 
find that hospitals with low initial levels of efficiency have successfully improved efficiency. 444 
Hospitals with high initial levels of efficiency seem to face less pressure to further improve 445 
efficiency so that their catch-up is considerably lower. The results could reflect that it is 446 
probably simpler to reap higher efficiency gains from low initial levels compared to higher 447 
efficiency levels. It could also be argued that the results only show that reforms aimed at 448 
improving efficiency – mostly targeted at low-performance hospitals – were successful. But 449 
this is not the entire story. We find a change in the pattern of nationwide hospital efficiency 450 
change coinciding with (but presumably caused by) the financial crisis in 2009. In the 451 
aftermath of the financial crisis, a systematic difference between hospitals in states with a 452 
high debt burden and hospitals in states with a low debt burden emerges, even though the 453 
possibility of hospital closures is still negligible. If budgetary constraints were the same in all 454 
states regardless of the debt burden – as a consequence of the unchanged probability of 455 
hospital closures – and if the initial level of efficiency were the only decisive factor for the 456 
differences in efficiency change, there should be no systematic differences. Yet controlling 457 
for this effect, we find that efficiency change is still 1.1 percentage points lower in states in a 458 
comfortable budgetary situation. This suggests that exogenous shocks to the public finances 459 
increase the budgetary pressure on public financing bodies, thereby counteracting the effect of 460 
potentially pre-existing SBCs. Concerning ownership, we do not find empirical evidence that 461 
privately owned hospitals respond differently to changing budgetary restrictions than publicly 462 
owned hospitals.  463 
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There are some limitations to the study design, which may impact the result. First, there are 464 
only nine Austrian states. As the debt ratio is defined at the state level, only nine groups are 465 
available for comparison, which makes it more difficult to obtain significant results, 466 
particularly when the effect is not very strong. This is also a possible explanation for why the 467 
results somewhat depend on the DEA model specifications (in addition to the generally low 468 
number of observations, and the varying sample sizes due to different outliers). We further 469 
stress that the high volatility of the efficiency scores impedes a causal interpretation of our 470 
regression results. As our estimates could be subject to omitted variable bias, they should be 471 
interpreted as explorative. A second limitation is that there is still no quality indicator 472 
available for hospital services. A good opportunity for future research would be to use a 473 
broader definition of efficiency that also includes a quality dimension, allowing for the 474 
possibility that decreases in cost can come at the expense of the quality of the health-care 475 
services provided to patients. And lastly, a possible shortcoming of measuring the state debt 476 
ratio as financial debt to overall budget is that the debt ratio does not include information 477 
about the assets of states vis-à-vis their financial liabilities, as the relevant information was 478 
not available for a sufficiently long period. Including this information in future research could 479 
help to more accurately capture the effect of the public debt ratio on the budgetary constraints 480 
of hospitals. 481 
  482 
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Appendix 
Data envelopment analysis: descriptive statistics  
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Inputs:               
Physicians 52 51 53 51 54 50 55 50 56 51 57 51 59 53 
Nurses 229 219 231 216 234 216 238 219 241 219 243 220 245 223 
Other staff 40 60 40 60 41 62 42 63 42 62 40 54 40 51 
Imputed costs in €1,000 764.75 1295.65 737.80 1204.36 849.65 1692.27 847.80 1386.43 834.40 1397.03 882.98 1459.65 902.76 1391.83 
Primary costs less labour and 
imputed costs in €1,000 4505.78 4805.03 4727.61 4989.31 4847.37 5064.68 5082.77 5184.64 5252.54 5352.16 5364.75 5414.58 5548.81 5567.02 
Medical costs (cost of 
medical commodities, 
consumables and third-party 
services) in €1,000 
3586.71 3680.36 3727.58 3764.879 3828.01 3937.54 3967.78 4124.65 4109.08 4306.49 4168.671 4360.42 4304.08 4508.51 
Operating costs less medical 
costs in €1,000 919.07 1275.07 1000.03 1373.17 1019.36 1289.56 1114.99 1230.03 1143.47 1312.80 1196.08 1340.79 1244.73 1347.67 
Secondary costs (cost of auxiliary 
cost centres allocated to inpatient 
cost centres) in €1,000 
18560.89 20650.86 19691.34 22181.57 19902.83 21358.05 20244.24 21505.40 20670.97 21837.52 21458.62 22488.24 22670.57 23536.56 
Outputs               
DRG credits (in 1,000) 36088.65 33096.47 36970.38 33417.16 38191.20 34416.24 38749.20 35078.81 39647.84 35742.81 40373.91 36499.80 41322.16 37307.81 
MEL credits (in 1,000) 19401.64 21100.22 20208.09 21761.57 21046.69 22653.12 21743.97 23453.61 22636.52 24452.63 23292.33 25385.91 23966.05 26058.39 
HDG + other credits (in 1,000) 16687.02 13510.20 16762.29 13177.99 17144.52 13326.68 17005.23 13040.80 17011.32 12693.77 17081.59 12581.60 17356.12 12756.81 
a Includes hospitals with zero inputs ( i.e. when at least one, but not all, inputs were zero in a period). 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for Austrian non-profit hospitals in the period 2002-2008 included in Model I (N=116a) 
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Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Inputs:               
Physicians 63 57 65 57 65 57 65 57 66 58 66 58 67 58 
Nurses 257 240 258 233 258 233 259 234 261 238 261 237 263 236 
Other staff 42 51 42 51 43 50 43 49 43 49 43 48 43 48 
Imputed costs in €1,000 811.36 1112.40 887.70 1509.98 886.55 1478.24 868.17 1384.97 587.07 1399.98 848.79 1336.07 821.15 1163.60 
Primary costs less labour and 
imputed costs in €1,000 5897.64 5963.68 5957.55 6071.48 5793.28 5875.53 5763.22 5924.26 5882.40 5985.09 5916.66 6063.89 6123.60 6260.754 
Medical costs (cost of 
medical commodities, 
consumables and third-party 
services) in €1,000 
4486.60 4839.49 4479.91 4885.49 4264.43 4715.07 4245.41 4717.99 4334.05 4744.37 4353.81 4816.31 4539.66 5069.29 
Operating costs less medical 
costs in €1,000 1411.04 1468.88 1477.64 1561.11 1528.85 1536.55 1517.82 1596.61 1548.35 1665.19 1562.85 1659.07 1583.94 1631.46 
Secondary costs (cost of auxiliary 
cost centres allocated to inpatient 
cost centres) in €1,000 
24400.85 25506.38 24901.14 26129.65 25123.51 26159.12 24937.63 25728.68 24834.48 25173.65 25121.99 25536.23 26127.47 26227.26 
Outputs               
DRG credits (in 1,000) 48017.73 44790.64 48723.01 45221.10 48926.99 45467.85 48894.23 45344.47 49458.32 46302.79 49639.06 46632.84 49784.93 46444.98 
MEL credits (in 1,000) 26226.52 29347.11 27078.46 30367.20 27543.14 30578.70 27669.33 30700.34 28063.92 31460.98 28420.45 32103.83 28675.80 32125.79 
HDG + other credits (in 1,000) 21791.21 17869.77 21644.56 17351.80 21383.86 17217.28 21224.90 17121.85 21394.24 17445.19 21218.61 17273.99 21109.13 16991.91 
a Includes hospitals with zero inputs (i.e. when at least one, but not all, inputs were zero in a period), but excludes hospitals that were closed entirely (i.e. when all inputs were zero in a period). 
b Difference in sample size due to hospital closures in 2009 ( N=115), 2010−2012 (N=114) and 2013−2014 (N=113). 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for Austrian non-profit hospitals in the period 2009−2015 included in Model I (N=112a,b) 
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Data envelopment analysis: method 
Assume that B = C,… , E  hospitals produce F = C,… , G  outputs, 	HF  using I = C,… ,J 
inputs KI. The production possibility set is assumed to satisfy the axioms stated in Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984). The input-oriented non-
radial efficiency for hospital k, which belongs to the set  of units to be analysed (‘reviewed’) 
and uses KI,LM  input quantities to produce HF,LM  output quantities, is evaluated with respect to the 
reference set  as follows, 
minQ<R,S 	TU
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-
-,U	
X
-:
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If the set of reviewees  to be analysed is identical with the reference set , i.e. if  = , the 
linear programme defined in (3) to (7) is always feasible and corresponds to the model 
proposed in Tone (2001). The efficiency measure δ  then satisfies δ ≤ 1 , with δ = 1 , 
indicating efficient service provision if and only if there is no excess input -. The slack 
variables - then indicate the maximum savings potential in the respective input with respect 
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to the reference technology. The convexity constraint ∑λp = 1 reflects variable returns-to-
scale (VRS) and is omitted under constant returns-to-scale (CRS). 
If reviewee q is removed from the reference set f, i.e.  ≠ , Tone (Tone, 2002) proposed 
the following super-efficiency model: 
minstR,u 	TU
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The super-efficiency measure δv  satisfies δv ≥ 1 , with δv > 1 , indicating the minimum 
average expansion rate of inputs, which still guarantees that the pertinent unit is located on the 
frontier of reference set . As only non-oriented models ensure feasibility of super-efficiency 
models, infeasible solutions to (8) to (12) may also occur. 
To increase the robustness of the efficiency scores, we use the bootstrapping technique 
proposed by Tone (2013) to simulate the data-generating process (DGP) as follows: 
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Step 1 Compute the input-oriented non-radial efficiency T	based on the actual input and 
output data 
Step 2 Repeat the following substeps } = 1,… , , times: 
i. Simulate the input/output data assuming a triangular distribution for the input-
output data with data variations being taken from historical data 
ii. Compute the input-oriented non-radial efficiency T~based on the simulated input 
and output data 
We then derive a bias-corrected efficiency T by 
T = 2 ∙ T − 1, ∙WT~

:
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